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But Is It Interpretivism?
Sören Häggqvist
Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University
In this critical notice I raise a couple of questions concerning Mölder’s ambitious
metaphysics, aimed at underpinning his Ascription eory. I argue that some of
the points he takes to depend on this metaphysics are in fact independent of it. I
further question whether the relation between the mental and the physical is quite
so unlike relations between special science entities and physics as Mölder suggests.
Finally I relate Mölder’s Ascription eory in very compressed form and suggest
that although its loosening of the strictures on what evidence an ascriber of mental
attitudes may avail herself of, it is not clear that the theory can really do without ra-
tionality considerations of the sort emphasised by Davidson and Dennett—at least
if it is to count as a species of interpretivism.
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1. e metaphysics
is very rich book oers the most detailed, systematic, and sustained de-
fense to date of interpretivism, as a general position in philosophy of mind.
It also proposes a novel elaboration of the view: a theory Mölder calls as-
criptivism. Mölder’s theory is importantly dierent from the views of the
position’s founding fathers, Dennett and Davidson.
Unlike Dennett, for instance, Mölder takes his metaphysics seriously.
A hey second chapter lays out the ontological groundwork. e many
points and distinctions made here are not idle but do real work in subse-
quent discussions. A central theme, to which Mölder returns over and over
throughout the book, is his insistence on a distinction between pleonastic
entities versus what he calls “the natural basis” (Mölder 2010, 21).1 e lat-
ter is what really exists. e former are what we get through what (Schier
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2003) calls “something-from-nothing transformations” like the following in-
ference (22):
Stephen is clever.erefore, Stephen has the property of being clever.
Applying existential quantication to the conclusions of such arguments,
one gets a quickly swelling ontology of properties,2 whose place in the natu-
ral world andwhose relations to other properties may become philosophical
quandaries. Mölder does not object to the inference, but to the ination of
ontology that results from taking it at face value: he calls talk of properties as
though they were real existents, or capturing description-independent na-
tures of things, “inationary” (20, 23). Andhe holds that very oen, such talk
is misguided, since the “properties” discussed are merely pleonastic. For the
distinction between natural and pleonastic entities, Mölder prefers to talk of
dierent “strata” rather than “levels” (31).is seems wise, since, as he notes,
levels-talk oen involves relations between entities which in his view belong
to the same stratum.3
Mölder is not committed to any particular theory of natural existents.
But he says that the qualier ‘natural’ is used to signal allegiance to a broadly
naturalist metaphysics (21); that “what are commonly taken to be natural
kinds surely belong to the natural basis” (23); and that “the natural basis
consists of ontologically basic physical entities and their congurations” (33,
italics in original). He also hints that individuation of such ontologically ba-
sic entities may go by causal powers (27), making foundational metaphysics
a project informed by and perhaps continuous with science (28).
Mental events, states, and properties are not natural existents on this
view: they belong to the pleonastic stratum. Moreover, neither mind itself
nor any psychological category are natural kinds with a hidden nature open
to a posteriori discovery (143).4 is is the basis of Mölder’s claim that pos-
session of mental states is inextricably tied to our everyday psychological
concepts, as these are reected in folk psychology.5 Note that this claim is
2 Provided one also takes the quantication to have ontological import. Mölder focusses on
generation of pleonastic properties, but as he mentions, similar mechanisms may be used
to generate e.g. facts, particulars and other apparent denizens of ontology.
3 For instance, both usual macro-micro distinctions and personal-subpersonal distinctions
“might be conned only to the pleonastic” (31, fn. 17); conversely, “natural properties can
form hierarchies of levels” (31, fn. 17).
4 Mölder here (143–144) invokes Ellis (2001), whose demanding criteria for natural kind-
hood—observer-independence, categorical distinctness and instrinsicality—are obviously
not met by mental states. He also invokes Dennett (1994), but does not comment on the
natural reading of Dennett as questioning the very notion of natural kinds invoked by e.g.
Putnam (1975).
5 It should be noted that Mölder does not take folk psychological platitudes to exhaust or
implicitly dene mental concepts, whether in the way suggested by Lewis (1972, 1994) or
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intended to fall short of saying that mental states themselves are just what
our everyday concepts take them to be. Ascription theory is oered only
as a theory of what it is to have mental states, and not of their nature. It
is one thing to specify possession conditions, another to give an account of
what the “constitution and individuating features” of a mental state are (12).
While not true of pleonastic entities across the board, in the case of mental
states, there is nothing more to be told about this than what goes into the
meanings of mental terms, i.e. into mental concepts. But ascription the-
ory is not a theory of meaning and does not yield one (and this is a chief
dierence with Davidson). Rather it presupposes that mental vocabulary is
already in place, equipped with public lexical meanings. e same goes, in
fact, for themeaning of every term. While ascription theory does specify ap-
plication conditions formental predicates—in otherwords, for possession of
pleonasticmental properties—these specications presume stablemeanings
of words in general; hence, there is no special problem of mental content or
intentionality: “in an ascription such as ‘John believes that there is a dog,’
the content of John’s belief is specied by terms that already have a common
meaning” (151). Mölder is optimistic about the prospects of such a prior,
general theory of meaning, even granted that such a theory cannot, if it is
to be non-circularly joined with ascription theory, invoke (a thinker’s being
in) mental states (152).
However, ifmental entities are on thewhole gotten on the cheap through
something-from-nothing transformations, why is not their “nature” ex-
hausted by the application conditions of the corresponding predicates? Af-
ter all, ascription theory aims to tell what it takes to belong to the extension
of these predicates. Why hold that the nature of mental states—given that
they aremerely pleonastic—lies in something as intensional as (non-mental,
public) concepts? Indeed, what is the point of talking of a “nature” here?
To the rst of these questions, perhaps an answer might be that the as-
cription theory actually does not provide criteria for belonging to the exten-
sions of mental predicates, and that there is some slack between correct and
warranted applications/attributions, even though reference to attribution is
partly constitutive for actual inclusion in the extensions. However, Mölder
does hold that canonical ascriptions do determine the mental facts, in the
sense of determining which mental attributions are correct. Yet, possession
conditions do not line up with individual mental states but provide only “a
general scheme that explicates the relations betweenmental phenomena and
their possession”; mental states “are not individuated by possession condi-
tions” (171). Perhaps this provides a basis for a dierent answer to the rst
Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996). But he argues that this is a problem for functional-
ism, and not for him (133–138).
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question. But I am not sure about this, nor what his response to the other
two questions is. Despite its overall clarity and analytic sophistication, there
are points where, as in this case, the book did not make it entirely clear (to
me) what Mölder’s position is.
Another instance of this is the question whether there is anything spe-
cial about the relation between the mental and the physical, as compared
to the relation between various special sciences and physics. is question
crops up in most discussions about reduction, autonomy, and causation in
recent decades’ philosophy of mind. Mölder makes a number of important
points pertinent to this issue in chapter 2. He rejects supervenience, rightly
I believe, as needlessly introducing more problems that it solves (even if one
gets the denition of it technically right and unambigious). He suggests,
and I agree, that assuming supervenience amounts to postulating an asym-
metric dependence-relation which itself seems in need of more explanation
than it can provide (35). I also accept his rejection of even weak superve-
nience of the mental on neural properties. But this point, like his rejection
of token identity theories, seems to depend straightforwardly on intepre-
tivism, rather than on the metaphysical distinction between a natural basis
and pleonastic entities (or between the deationary and inationary). Con-
cerning token identity, Mölder writes: “On the deationary view . . . the ap-
plication of a mental description is nothing of the sort that needs to be ex-
hausted by or based on a physical particular, nor is it intelligible how it could
be.” (54) But this too seems like something an interpretivist should hold ir-
respective of her metaphysics.
Where the metaphysical machinery is really made to do some work is in
Mölder’s rejection of functionalism. In an unusually ambitious discussion of
realisation (57–70), Mölder rejects role functionalism on the grounds that
role functional properties cannot be distinct from their realisers. And he
seems here to suggest that there is a peculiar problem besetting any attempt
to account for a realisation relation between natural base properties and
mental properties, a problem distinct from other cases of seemingly mul-
tiply realisable properties (65–66). But here one may ask why the mental
case is considered to be so special. Given the wide reach of the arguments
Mölder uses against (role) functionalism, is there any room for functional
properties at all? Perhaps Mölder would reply that since natural properties
should be individuated by causal powers, the natural base itself consists en-
tirely of functional properties (in a sense), but there seems little room for
multiple realizability at the natural stratum.
Conversely, whenMölder says that asciption theory is physicalist “in the
sense of Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (1996)” and so reckons with an on-
tology only of “the entities recognised by the physical sciences and their nat-
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uralist extensions” (33), it is natural to ask just why psychology, as Mölder
clearly assumes, is not among these. An answer might presumably invoke a
distinction between intensional and extensional contexts, but Mölder does
not elaborate on this (this is one place where Davidson was actually clearer).
And the question remains what to make of all the (presumably pleonastic)
entities apparently reckoned with in those extensions of the physical sci-
ences.
2. e theory
Mölder’s theory holds that the possession condition for, say, “. . . believes that
it is raining” is given by what is canonically ascribable to a subject X, accord-
ing to the schema (175):
Possession condition for X f ’s that p: f ’s that p is canonically ascrib-
able to X.
Canonical ascription, in turn, is dened this way, where ‘As’ abbreviates an
ascription statement of the form ‘X f ’s that p’ (175):
As is a canonical ascription statement =df As is a statement in ap-
proximation to the maximum coherence with the ascription sources
c1 , . . . , c4 and ifAswere in fact ascribed, it would not require revision.
ere are, according to Mölder, four main sources of ascriptions (hence the
numbering above): other contentful ascribable mental states; the subject’s
behaviour; the subject’s environmental stimuli; and the subject’s history or
background (161–162). I will rst make a few expository comments and then
raise a couple of questions about these denitions and the theory they are
used in.
First, the possession condition does not require that any actual ascrip-
tion takes place. Ascribability is a modal notion, although Mölder stresses
that he wishes to make an actual ascription, as it were, nearby possibility
when it does not occur. Second, the fact that an ascription does not re-
quire revision does not imply that it is unrevisable (174). It just means that it
is stable or settled. ird, although she is not mentioned explicitly in the
deniens, the denition of a canonical ascription statement presupposes
or makes implicit reference to an ascriber (Mölder sometimes talks about
“canonical ascribers”).is is not a postulated ideal gure, but anyone of us
much of the time in our folk-psychological dealings with each other. Fourth,
although anyone can occupy the ascriber’s role, we may not know when our
ascriptions full the requirements for canonicality. Fih, insofar as there
may be several approximations, given the evidence from the ascription
sources, to maximum coherence, there may also be several valid ascriptions;
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but if even a canonical ascriber is faced with a choice between incompatible
ascriptions, this is a reason for her to not (yet) accept any of them as canon-
ical (184). Whatever dierences remain between canonical ascriptions will,
Mölder holds, perhaps lead to plurality (of mental state possession) rather
than indeterminacy (183). Sixth, and crucially, the theory requires coher-
ence (or approximate maximum coherence) among the ascriber’s pieces of
evidence, but not among the attributee’s beliefs or other attitudes.
It is a sympathetic streak inMölder’s theory that he allows an interpreter
not just common sense but also the wisdom about others encoded in folk
psychology. Mölder eschews imposing on interpreters knowledge of how to
construct T-theories from a narrow evidence base of holding-true, as well
as any canons of decision theory and probability calculus. e evidence al-
lowed for intepretation is wide-ranging. But while Davidson and Dennett,
arguably, have a story about what it is to be a believer, Mölder simply de-
fers to folk psychology on this issue.us, in discussing the “liberalism ob-
jection” exemplied by Block’s Blockhead example, he writes: “since mental
predicates are ascribed from the folk-psychological standpoint, this perspec-
tive has already circumscribed the range of potential subjects of interpre-
tation” (193). is is slightly disappointing, given that ascription theory is
not intended as a psychologically realistic description of how psychological
states are attributed but as a metaphysical account of what their possession
consists in (even if Mölder holds that not just the states, but also the subjects
possessing them and the ascibers attributing them, aremerely pleonastic en-
tities).
Connectedly, itmight be asked howmuch or little evidence is required—
from the four types of source Mölder reckons with—in order to warrant an
ascription. Presumably, if the subject belongs to the circumscribed range
(a normal adult human, say), very little evidence may warrant ascription.
Mölder has more to say about coherence between pieces of evidence than
about volume, and the interesting question, perhaps, is whether even in the
limiting case of just seeing a person standing in the sun—but about whom
one knows nothing else—is enough for ascribing to her the belief that the
sun is shining (this is not zero evidence, of course, but draws on environ-
mental stimuli).6 Aer all, the less the amount of evidence is, the easier
will it tend to be to achieve coherence among it. But perhaps there is a
limit where ascriptions based on verymeagre evidence—and thus bordering
6 Mölder has a sophisticated technical discussion of coherence, drawing onagard (2000)
and applying his algorithm to the problem of approximating maximal coherence for as-
ciption statements (165–170). A problem with agard’s approach is that it nesses the
philosophically important questions of what makes for the weights of contraints it takes as
input (cf. Glymour 1992).
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on charity—cannot satisfy the condition of not requiring revision and thus
reaching canonical status.
Curiously, despite Mölder’s labeling ascription theory a version of inter-
pretivism, interpretation in any more hermeneutical sense seems to play a
much lesser role for him than in Davidson’s andDennett’s theories. Mölder’s
account allows a very broad spectrum of sources or evidence for ascriptions.
is is perhaps connected with his interesting rejection of one of the central
ideas in Davidson’s and Dennett’s work: that we are required to ascribe min-
imal rationality to the subject we’re attributing intentional attitudes to.eir
rationality requirement, simply put, is that the subject has largely coherent
attitudes, acts in ways rationalisable given those attitudes, and holds beliefs
largely true by the interpreter’s lights (Davidson) or has wishes and beliefs
congruent with her biological endowment, niche, and needs (Dennett).
Mölder writes: “I am inclined to think that the quarrel over rationality
is a red herring in discussion about interpretation.” (119). And his theory
does not require even coherence among the attributee’s beliefs, for we may
see how evidence from the subject’s behaviour and environment warrants
ascription, for example in the light of evidence from her idiosynchratic his-
tory, of inconsistent beliefs. At the same time, Mölder accepts the holism of
the mental, and notes that “mental states are ascribable in holistic bundles”
(123). He also notes that such holistic ascription is tied up with the need to
make beliefs and other attitudes “intelligible” (123). Holism is also invoked
as a reason to allow other ascribable mental states as a source of evidence
(161). Presumably the ascribability of “other” mental states is constrained
in similar ways, though, so there is a question whether it is not misleading
to represent this as a source of evidence on a par with the three other ones.
And in both Dennett and, especially, Davidson, the rationality assumptions
made on the subject’s part are tied to the fact that mental holism is chiey
content holism: inconsistencies among ascribed beliefs undermine not only
the project of making sense of the interpretee, but of making sense of indi-
vidual beliefs (desires, etc) as well. Here, Mölder’s approach is very dierent.
As we saw, he takes the meaning of “X believes that p” to be already settled
whenever an attribution is (or could bemade), for any substitution-instance.
is is ne, but the question where the need for coherence on the subject’s
part becomes pressing, is how to make sense of—make intelligible—a case
such as Dennett’s (1987, 14):
A biologist friend of mine was once called on the telephone by a man
in a bar who wanted him to settle a bet. e man asked: “Are rabbits
birds?” “No” said the biologist. “Damn!” said the man as he hung
up. Now could he really have believed that rabbits were birds? Could
anyone really and truly be attributed that belief? Perhaps, but it would
take a bit of a story to bring us to accept it.
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e story needed seems to be one precisely granting a measure of coherence
on the interpretee’s beliefs. Short of that, it is hard to see how to warrant
ascription. Similar considerations motivate Davidson’s insistence on coher-
ence. I am not sure why Mölder appears less impressed by such considera-
tions, but I suspect that this may be because of meaning-theoretical views
not made explicit in the book. However, even if there is no question over
the meaning of the statements used to ascribe beliefs, the problem of how
incoherent chunks of beliefs—as opposed to particular false beliefs—might
be ascribable does not go away, and I would have welcomed a discussion of
why Mölder does not nd Dennett’s and Davidson’s arguments against this
possibility compelling.
is issue is connected with another one on which Mölder says very lit-
tle: of what to make of evidence consisting of specically verbal behaviour.
In Davidson, of course, this issue has centre stage, and Mölder diers from
Davidson not just in not aiming to provide a theory of meaning, but in ac-
cepting already interpreted speech of a subject into the evidence base for
ascriptions of attitudes. But as the Dennett example makes vivid, issues of
interpretation oen enter even if such evidence is granted, and they bear on
what an ascriber is to make of the evidence.
Moreover, there is the rationality requirement on relations between be-
liefs, desires, and actions. Mölder specically insists on a distinction be-
tween intelligibility and rationality, where the latter “cannot be a constitutive
requirement for interpretation” (120). As illustration, he uses an example in
(Levin 1988): a man wishes to clean his carpet and belives that he can do
so by using his vacuum cleaner. But instead of using it, he washes his car.
is is intelligible, Levin andMölder say, if the man regularly is reminded of
car washing when thinking about vacuum cleaners, and even generally be-
haves according to the regularity “If [the subject] wants Q and believes that
P brings about Q, and P reminds [the subject] of R, then [the subject] will
do R” (Levin 1988, 212, quoted in Mölder, 120). And so it is. But in order to
know that the man behaves in accordance with this psychological regularity,
can an interpreter proceed without rationality assumptions connecting his
actions in general with his beliefs and desires in a less idiosynchratic way?
is seems dubious.
A nal note on Dennett. Mölder makes a valiant attempt to package
Dennett’s views in his ownpreferredmetaphysics (115–116). But in discussing
Dennett, Mölder oen appears to equate patterns, as Dennett uses the no-
tion, with mental states (with content), and to take Dennett’s theory as one
where “intentional patterns” are ascribed. Although Dennett is elusive on
the subject of patterns, I think that it is fairly clear that he takes the “real
patterns” (Dennett 1991), whose reality grant a measure of realism to his
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view, as not themselves the attitudes whose ascription they motivate. Nor
do I think that McLaughlin and O’Leary-Hawthorne’s 1994 reading of Den-
nett, on which attitude talk concerns internal dispositions to behaviour, is
correct (Mölder suggests that Dennett 1987 supports their reading, but I beg
to dier). Dennett’s talk of patterns goes from the clear cases of compression
theory, via the still fairly clear cases of Conway’s Game of Life, to the case
of patterns grounding (sort of) the intentional stance; when it reaches the
latter, it is arguably just a suggestive but elusive metaphor. But in order to
make sense of Dennett’s rationales for the intentional stance, I believe that
patterns here must be simply patterns in behaviour. ese do not super-
vene on internal dispositions, however, for they depend on how the world
surrounding the subject is. So they are not themselves “intentional”; and in
fact, in the quotations Mölder provides in connection with his discussions
of “intentional patterns” (e.g. on 116), Dennett actually does not speak of
intentional patterns, but simply of (various kinds of) patterns.
In sum, although I am not convinced that ascription theory is the best
version of intepretivism available—or even that it is a form of interpre-
tivism—Mölder’s book is enormously rich in ideas and detailed discussion,
and it is the most penetrating study of the general approach I have seen. I
do remain suspicious of the streak of metaphysical puritanism enveloping
Mölder’s ascriptionism, and I am unsure—despite Mölder’s repeated insis-
tence to the contrary—how essential his Schierian metaphysics is to his
theory.
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